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Abstract 
We quantify the externalities associated with unconventional oil and gas development using 
hedonic valuation. One complication in determining local impacts is that some but not all 
properties are unified with mineral rights, which enable the residents to financially benefit from 
drilling, and this information is typically unobserved by researchers. To overcome this issue, we 
exploit the mineral severance legacy of the homestead act extensions of the 20th century to 
identify properties in Western Colorado that do not have mineral rights and are therefore only 
impacted negatively by drilling. We find housing prices decline about 35% when drilling occurs 
within one mile. Treated properties are affected by highly-intensive drilling (~16 wells drilled 
within a mile, on average) and there is suggestive evidence of non-linear impacts on a per-well 
basis. Our estimate of local costs is larger than those found elsewhere in the literature, which 
demonstrates the critical importance of mineral ownership. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Shale and tight oil and gas basins have emerged as important sources of energy in the 
United States through innovations in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. This 
development has led to significant impacts on residents and landowners that are close to drilling 
activities. There are environmental risks associated with unconventional oil and gas development 
related to groundwater contamination (Osborn et al. 2011), surface water pollution (Olmstead et 
al. 2013), wastewater management (Rahm and Riha 2012), and infant health (Hill 2013; 
McKenzie et al. 2014). However, there are positive impacts, especially for those residents that 
lease their mineral rights to drilling companies in return for signing bonuses and royalty 
payments (Fitzgerald 2014; Hardy and Kelsey 2015).1 Royalty payments can be as high as 20% 
of the value of production and lease signing bonuses can reach into the thousands of dollars per 
acre leased (e.g., Brasier et al. 2011; Kelly-Detwiler 2013).   
There is a growing body of literature in economics that estimates the value of local 
impacts of unconventional oil and gas development through hedonic valuation, with remarkable 
variation in estimates.  Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) examine price responses in 
southwestern Pennsylvania and find that prices can decline by as much as 22% for private well-
water dependent properties, but generally are smaller and short lived. Muehlenbachs, Spiller, and 
Timmins (2015) use data from across Pennsylvania and find that shale development can lead to 
depreciation as high as 17% for well water properties within 1.5 kilometers of an unconventional 
drill site. They also find that drilling can have a small positive impact on property sale prices in 
public water supply areas. Delgado, Guilfoos, and Boslett (2016) use data from Northeastern 
Pennsylvania and find no robust impact of nearby drilling. Boslett, Guilfoos, and Lang (2016) 
examine the impact of the New York State moratorium on unconventional drilling and find New 
York properties most likely to be impacted by shale gas development declined 24% in value 
relative to comparable Pennsylvania properties after the moratorium. They interpret this finding 
as a positive expected net value of shale gas development. Weber and Hitaj (2015) find evidence 
 
1 The United States is unique in that private citizens can own the minerals underneath their property. In most 
countries, it is the government or the crown that owns all subsurface rights (Kulander 2013). Since U.S. citizens can 
own their properties’ minerals, they can financially benefit from drilling through leasing.  The possibility of 
financial benefits has led to more public support for unconventional oil and gas development in the United States 
than in other countries (e.g., Stevens 2010; Gény 2010). Private mineral rights ownership has been crucial in driving 
development in the United States (Wang and Krupnick 2013). 
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of appreciation in farm property values in both Pennsylvania and Texas, especially during 
leasing periods. Importantly, their estimates are attenuated in areas with significant mineral 
severance. Using zip code level aggregate data from Texas, Weber, Burnett, and Xiarchos (2016) 
find evidence of both appreciation and depreciation due to shale development. In Colorado, 
Bennett and Loomis (2015) find mixed results that are often not statistically significant. Also in 
Colorado, James and James (2015) find that a one kilometer decrease in distance away from an 
unconventional well is associated with a 7 to 20% decrease in sale price. However, this effect 
can be mitigated if the property is above a horizontal well lateral, which suggests royalty 
payments from leasing are capitalized into prices. There remain large variations in estimates of 
shale gas development on property prices without sufficient explanation. 
One potential reason for the contrasting results is that mineral right ownership is not 
explicitly accounted for in these studies.2 Mineral ownership is important because it firmly 
demarcates those who financially benefit from unconventional gas development through 
royalties and lease payments versus those who do not. Without information about mineral 
ownership at the property level, it is unclear how to separate the negative impacts (aesthetic, 
environmental, and health costs) and positive financial impacts (royalty and lease payments) of 
proximity to shale development in most study areas.  
In Pennsylvania, which is the focus of several of the above studies, mineral right 
ownership varies substantially and systematically across the state. Mineral rights are more often 
severed from surface rights in western Pennsylvania, which has a long legacy of energy 
extraction, versus northeastern Pennsylvania, where energy extraction only started recently 
(Kelsey, Metcalf, and Salcedo 2012). If mineral severance is less common in northeastern 
Pennsylvania, then it is not surprising that the valuation studies focused on the area estimate less 
negative (or even positive) impacts of shale gas.3 It is noteworthy that Muehlenbachs et al. 
(2015) estimate the risks to groundwater by comparing the sources of water and proximity to 
shale gas development. This would only lead to bias if mineral rights differed systematically by 
water source in a narrow band around the piped water boundary, which their research design 
minimizes. 
 
2 See Table 1A in the online appendix on a review of the previous literature and how each paper contextualized the 
issue of mineral rights ownership. 
3 Consistent with this interpretation of the valuation results, homeowners that do not own mineral rights have an 
increased perception of environmental risk (Brasier et al. 2013) and frustration (Collins and Nkansah 2015). 
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While the important distinction between private well water and public water properties 
has been identified by the existing hedonic valuation literature, the critical issue of mineral rights 
ownership has not been resolved. This has not been a lack of foresight or understanding by 
researchers of the importance of mineral ownership in how people are impacted by drilling. 
Rather, this information is extremely difficult for researchers to obtain.4  
In this paper, we resolve the issue of unknown mineral rights by exploiting historical 
severance in mineral rights ownership. During the 19th century, the United States expanded its 
boundaries through territorial acquisition. Over time, the country developed this land by granting 
both land and mineral rights to settlers starting with the Homestead Act of 1862. In the late 
1800s and early 1900s, the federal government recognized both the increasing value of energy 
for economic growth and the government’s inability to properly identify “mineral” lands, which 
they kept in federal ownership, and “nonmineral” lands, which they disbursed for homesteading. 
In response, the federal government passed a series of laws that increasingly reserved minerals in 
federal ownership, leading to the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 (SRHA). The SRHA 
continued the tradition of public land disbursement, but the federal government retained 
ownership of minerals in all land disbursed after 1916 (Gates 1977; Harrison 1989).5  
To build our dataset of transactions, we identify residential properties in Colorado located 
on land originally distributed under the SRHA and other policies that retained mineral ownership 
in the federal government. Thus, the federal government owns the mineral rights for each of 
these properties and current residents do not benefit financially from lease and royalty payments. 
Our study area is on the western slope of Colorado, centered in Garfield, Mesa, and Rio Blanco 
counties. Western Colorado was one of the major areas of post-1916 homesteading and this 
region is one of the primary locations of unconventional oil and gas development in the state.  
Our hedonic analysis suggests that houses within one mile of an unconventional drill site 
 
4 Mineral right ownership information is held in county deeds offices and is not commonly included in property 
deeds. The chain of title can be unclear, especially when the mineral estate was separated from the surface estate 
after the property was originally conveyed. Charting mineral rights ownership over time is the full-time job of a title 
abstractor (Wilson 2014). Suffice it to say, it would be difficult for researchers to successfully obtain mineral rights 
ownership information for a large property transaction database. One of the authors of this study spent a day at 
Pennsylvania’s Bradford County’s Register and Recorder office researching mineral rights transfers and can attest to 
this.  
5 Although there were other federal policies passed in the early 20th century with a similar effect (e.g., Agricultural 
Entry Act of 1914), we focus most of our discussion on the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, as it completely 
discontinued the conveyance of minerals through homestead patents. It is also the largest source of privately held 
land with federal minerals (Watson, 2008). 
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sell for 34.8% less than comparable properties without proximate drilling. This identification is 
based on 783 properties with a split estate status of which 98 are treated with proximity to 
drilling. This result is robust across various subsets of the data and alternative regression 
specifications, including a repeat sales model, a matching model, and a difference-in-differences 
model. When multiplied by the average house price of $183,300, this discount translates to a 
price reduction of $63,788, which equals $3,952 when annualized by a 30-year mortgage and a 
5% interest rate. We interpret this price difference as the household valuation of the external 
environmental and health costs associated with proximity to unconventional oil and gas 
development.  
Our findings corroborate the negative valuations found in other papers, but are 60% 
larger in magnitude than the largest existing negative estimate on aggregate.6 Estimates from 
other studies are based on a variety of measures (e.g., per-well, per-well pad, distance to closest 
well, presence of well). While it is difficult to compare across measures, our back-of-the-
envelope calculations indicate our aggregate estimate of presence is greater than aggregate 
estimates from other hedonic studies.7 The disparity between our estimates and other’s studies 
demonstrates the importance of understanding mineral rights, as financial benefits of drilling are 
capitalized into housing prices and can adulterate estimates of external costs. Supporting this 
conclusion, we estimate hedonic models using Western Colorado properties with unknown 
mineral rights ownership, mirroring the setup of prior studies, and find much smaller and 
statistically weaker impacts of proximity (available in the online appendix).  
Our paper is structured as follows. We start in Section 2 with a conceptual framework 
that discusses the issue of mineral rights ownership in valuation of unconventional oil and gas 
development. In Section 3, we outline the history of public land disposal and how it came to be 
that the later policies in the early 20th century reserved mineral ownership to the federal 
government. In Section 4, we discuss our data set and how we obtained it. We then follow in 
Section 5 with a discussion our methodological approach and the assumptions we use in our 
interpretation of our model results. In Section 6, we present our results, and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
 
6 Krupnik and Escharte (2017) provide a comprehensive review of this literature and discuss magnitudes of findings. 
7 In Section 6, we also present results from models that allow for an average effect of presence and a per-well 
intensity effect. The per-well estimated coefficient is smaller than some others in the literature, but the presence 
effect remains large and indicates strong non-linearities.  
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In this section, we outline the potential biases in hedonic valuation of unconventional oil 
and gas development. The net effect of oil and gas development vary across mineral estate 
classifications. While environmental and health risks should be independent of mineral rights, 
the vast majority of financial benefits, such as a lease signing bonus and production-based 
royalties, only accrue to households with mineral rights. Thus, in a split estate, where the surface 
property owner does not own the mineral rights, the surface owner cannot financially benefit 
from drilling. Only residential properties that are unified with mineral rights can receive direct 
financial benefits. One way that surface ownership can be split from mineral rights is through the 
issuance of a severance deed, in which a private landowner sells the land but retains the minerals. 
This situation is common in areas of the country that have experienced historical energy 
development and mining (e.g., Kelsey et al. 2012; Pender, Weber, and Brown 2014; Railroad 
Commission of Texas 2015). It was also done as a result of the homestead act extensions of the 
early 20th century, such as the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, which we detail in the 
following section. A split estate is analogous to mineral ownership law in other countries: private 
land owners neither control the course of oil and gas development, nor financially benefit from 
it. The mineral estate is essentially dominant, which means that the surface owner must 
accommodate exploration and production by the mineral owner.   
We define the price of property i as 𝑃𝑖(∙), a function of environmental characteristics 𝐸𝑖, 
the financial benefits of oil and gas development 𝐹𝑖, and structural characteristics. The 
environmental quality of the property is influenced by proximate oil and gas development, 𝐷𝑖. 
These impacts could be associated with diminished water quality, air quality, forest and habitat 
fragmentation, or visual or noise disamenities. We assume that the impact of 𝐷𝑖 on 𝐸𝑖 is uniform 
for all properties. Additionally, the financial benefits of owning the property are impacted by 𝐷𝑖. 
This model presents the difference between treatment and control, where treatment is defined as 
properties in proximity to oil and gas development.  This presumes that area-wide effects of 
drilling activity are not a consequence of proximate drilling activity, but rather overall drilling 
activity in the area, and affect our control and treatment properties equally.  Examples of area-
wide effects might include adjustments in the job market or a boost to local government finances 
through additional taxes, both of which may affect the area demand for housing. 
In this framework, mineral ownership is defined as a binary variable, 𝑀𝑖, equal to 1 if the 
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property’s surface estate is connected with its mineral estate and equal to 0 otherwise. The net 
valuation of unconventional oil and gas development for property i can be decomposed as 
follows:  
(1) 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 =
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝐸𝑖
∙
𝜕𝐸𝑖
𝜕𝐷𝑖
+ 𝑀𝑖 ∙
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝐹𝑖
∙
𝜕𝐹𝑖
𝜕𝐷𝑖
 
Thus, the valuation of development, as capitalized by housing prices, is a net valuation of the 
environmental impacts of development (first term) and the financial benefits of development, 
contingent on ownership of the property’s mineral estate (second term). For the sake of 
simplicity, we re-write the equation as: 
(2) 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = 𝐶 + 𝑀𝑖 ∙ 𝐵 
where C and B refer to the true values of the capitalization of the financial benefits and 
environmental costs (Table 1). If a property has mineral rights, then the estimated valuation will 
be the net impact, C +  B. However, if a property is a split estate, then the estimated valuation 
will be the external costs of being proximate to drilling.  
In order for researchers to estimate valuation with real data, a residential property market 
level analysis is required. We define 𝜃 as the proportion of properties unified with their minerals. 
Using the terminology from Table 1, we have: 
(3) 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = (𝐶 + 𝐵) ∙ 𝜃 + 𝐶 ∙ (1 − 𝜃) 
The estimated valuation is conditional on the proportion of treated properties with mineral rights, 
which is unknown to the researcher. Knowing either C +  B or C is useful for understanding local 
impacts and for guiding policy. But a weighted average of the two with an unknown weight 
yields imprecise guidance.   
In this paper, we take advantage of the historical split in mineral rights from surface 
rights caused by the SRHA and other public land disposal policies of the early 20th century. 
Thus, in our sample, 𝜃 = 0 and we can isolate the environmental costs, C, from the financial 
benefits of development. This framework assumes there are no area level impacts of oil and gas 
development on properties which differ by mineral rights ownership, which would impact the 
estimate of proximity to wells.  This potential issue is easily addressed with information about 
mineral rights ownership over the entire population of sales, or restricting the sample to only 
those properties without mineral rights ownership, i.e. 𝜃 = 0, as we do in this study. 
There are significant challenges in identification when evaluating properties with 
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unknown mineral ownership and comparing them with properties with federal mineral 
ownership. There are possible unobservable differences related to the land’s original disposal. 
There may also be differences in royalty and lease payment negotiations and surface use 
agreements between wells drilled on or near lands with federal mineral ownership versus those 
without federal mineral ownership. Wells on privately-owned properties with non-federal 
mineral ownership are subject to state regulations; those on lands with federal mineral ownership 
are subject to both state and federal regulations. Private landowners may also be more (or less) 
likely to implement significant surface use protections than the federal government. The siting of 
wells on privately-owned land with mineral rights may be endogenous causing identification 
problems. We also do not know the relative proportion of properties with connected mineral 
ownership. Any estimated effect for these properties is an average effect of living near a well 
between properties with or without connected minerals and is thus an unknown weighted average 
of the financial benefits versus environmental costs. With these potential issues in mind, in our 
primary specification, we use a subset of properties designed to cleanly identify split mineral 
rights ownership.  
 
 
3. History of the Homestead Acts  
 
During the first half of the 19th century, the United States made a series of land 
acquisitions that greatly increased the land area of the country (e.g., the Louisiana 
Purchase). How to apportion and settle these lands were major political questions facing 
the United States (Gates 1968; Anderson and Hill 1990). Initially, the federal government’s 
policy revolved around auctions and land sales, which allowed the federal government to 
generate income while encouraging settlement of the western public domain (Gates 1968). 
To help defray the cost of building railroad track networks across the country, the federal 
government also gave significant amounts of land to railroad companies (Roberts 2011). 
From 1830 to 1888, more than 300 million acres of land were given to railroad companies 
(Harrison 1989). This land was typically of high quality and close to the towns and cities 
that would ultimately make up the hubs of the transcontinental railroads. The railroad 
companies sold this land to individuals and families moving into the west for prices much 
higher than those faced by squatters through preemption (Gates 1968). 
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However, these and other policies encouraged speculation and massive 
landholdings by a small number of companies. With these issues in mind, federal policy 
transitioned in the latter half of the 19th century and early 20th century to one based on free 
disposal of land (Allen 1991). The movement culminated in a series of homestead acts in 
the late 1800s and early 1900s. These acts provided free land to settlers on the condition 
that some ranching, cropping or timber management would be performed on the property. 
In total, homesteaders received patents to 253 million acres of the continental United 
States. The relative portion of total land disbursed to homesteaders was particularly high in 
the Great Plains and Rocky Mountain states. In Colorado, 33% of the state’s land was 
distributed to homesteaders (Edwards 2009). 
Early homestead acts apportioned both surface and subsurface rights to 
homesteaders. This was the case for the original Homestead Act of 1862, signed by 
President Abraham Lincoln after the separation of the Confederacy from the United States. 
These lands were selected for disbursement due to their perceived “nonmineral” character, 
as delineated by General Land Office’s entrymen and surveyors. All lands with mineral 
potential were retained by the federal government. However, nonmineral vs. mineral land 
demarcation was imperfect due to technology limitations and pervasive fraud (Harrison 
1989).  
Recognizing the limitations of the original policy (Doran and Cifor 2012) and the 
need for mineral conservation for future generations (Gates 1968), the federal government 
passed a series of acts that explicitly outlined their desire to retain mineral ownership while 
promoting continued settlement. These acts included the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 
1910, the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914, and the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 
(SRHA). The Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 allowed homestead patents on lands 
suspected to hold coal reserves but reserved federal ownership of the resource (Fleck, 
1974). The Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 reserved federal ownership of a suite of 
minerals, including oil and gas, in future homestead entries made under earlier land acts 
(Verity and Young, 1971).  
The Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 expanded the Agricultural Entry Act to 
include all minerals. The legacy of this policy is considerable. More entries were filed 
under the SRHA than in any of the other land acts of the 1900s (Laitos, Zellmer, and Wood 
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2015) and it is the largest source of privately-held land with federal minerals (Watson, 
2008). The SRHA effectively discontinued the mineral-nonmineral classification system 
(Harrison 1989). Homesteading individuals were granted no more than a section of land for 
ranching and forage crop production, conditional on making permanent improvements on 
the land within three years of the entry date. However, the federal government would retain 
mineral ownership of all lands disbursed through the SRHA:   
  
“That all entries made and patents issued under the provisions of this Act shall be 
subject to and contain a reservation to the United States of all coal and other 
minerals in the lands so entered and patented, together with the right to prospect 
for, mine, and remove the same.”8   
  
Homesteaders and other later surface right owners must allow access to the  
land for subsurface exploration and production:   
  
“Any person who has acquired from the United States the coal or other mineral 
deposits in any such land, or the right to mine and remove the same, may reenter 
and occupy so much of the surface thereof as may be required for all purposes 
reasonably incident to the mining or removal of the coal or other minerals, first, 
upon securing the written consent or waiver the homestead entryman or patentee; 
second, upon payment of the damages to crops or other tangible improvements to 
the owner thereof…or, third, in lieu of either of the forgoing provisions, upon the 
execution of a good and sufficient bond…to secure the payment of such damages to 
the crops or tangible improvements of the entryman or owner.”9   
  
This condition precludes the surface owner from preventing mineral exploration. 
This is because the intent of the act was to continue the practice of homesteading and 
agricultural development of the West without compromising the federal government’s 
 
8 The Statues at Large of the United States of America from December, 1915 to March, 1917. Session 2. Chapter 9. 
Section 9. Page 864.  
9 The Statues at Large of the United States of America from December, 1915 to March, 1917. Session 2. Chapter 9. 
Section 9. Page 864.  
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interest in mineral exploration (Tanke and Putz 1982). If the surface owner had the right to 
prevent production from the property, the mineral estate would have no value.  
The SRHA led to a significant amount of private land with federal mineral 
ownership in the western United States. Out of approximately 300 million acres conveyed 
to private individuals through the various homesteading acts (Loomis 2002), nearly 60 
million acres have been split from their underlying subsurface estates as a result of the 
SRHA. In Colorado alone, these lands total 5.2 million acres. Figure 1 shows lands with 
federal mineral ownership across Colorado.  
On privately-owned lands with federal mineral ownership as a result of the SRHA 
or AEA, the mineral lessee must make a “good faith effort” to secure surface owner 
consent to access the property (Bureau of Land Management 2007). However, the surface 
estate owner is only entitled to compensation associated with damages to crops and 
agricultural-related improvements. Thus, in the context of shale gas extraction, a 
homeowner may be exposed to water contamination, air pollution, noise, and visual dis-
amenities, but not be entitled to compensation.10 
More recent legislation has maintained surface use access for mineral rights 
interests while providing some limited protection to surface owners through 
accommodation doctrine. In Colorado, the principle requires that operators make a serious 
effort towards accommodating the landowner’s use of the land by locating infrastructure 
and adjusting operation plans to reduce impacts of oil and gas development on the land.11 
The mineral owner may only access the surface if there are no other alternatives that could 
avoid interference with the present surface uses (Johnson 1998). However, it is difficult for 
surface owners to prove that the use of the surface by the mineral owner is not 
“reasonable.” Thus, mineral rights dominance has been kept in place even with 
accommodation doctrine codified by legislation (Kulander 2013).  
 
4. Empirical Setting and Data 
 
10 If the mineral lessee cannot come to a surface use agreement with the land owner, the company must rely on 
a performance bond to indemnify against unforeseen damages to crops and agricultural improvements. 
However, this bond does not cover all damages that a surface owner may face from drilling. It is typically 
valued at $2,000. Thus, it is common for property owners to receive less money than they would expect given 
the use of their land (Fitzgerald, 2010).   
11 Colorado Revised Statute 34-60-127.   
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Colorado has a long history of oil and gas development. According to data from the U.S. 
Geological Survey (Biewick 2008), most Colorado counties have experienced oil and gas 
exploration since the early 1900s. Some counties, especially those outside of the intermountain 
areas, have seen a large increase in oil and gas development since the 1940s.  
More recently, the new technologies of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing have 
been used for extraction in Colorado. According to Drillinginfo, over 11,000 horizontal wells 
were drilled in Colorado between 2000 and 2014.  Figure 1 displays the spatial distribution of 
this drilling. There are generally three drilling hotspots: northwestern Colorado, Weld County on 
Colorado’s Front Range, and La Plata and Montezuma counties in southwestern Colorado. Our 
study focuses on northwestern Colorado because there is extensive federal mineral ownership in 
this area. Bennett and Loomis and (2015) and James and James (2016) examine impacts in Weld 
County, which is more densely populated, but has much less federal mineral ownership than 
northwestern Colorado. Montezuma County contains many tribal lands, which complicates 
analysis due to jurisdictional complexity of mineral development and policy (West 1992). 
In this study, we use residential property transaction data from Garfield, Mesa, and Rio 
Blanco counties in western Colorado.12 We received the data from each county assessor’s office. 
All transactions in our analyses occurred from 2000 to the end of 2014. All transaction data 
contain property characteristic information including the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, 
living area, age of the property’s structure, and its classified property or land use. We include 
only those transactions that are defined as residential or agricultural with a residential building 
(N = 55,114). All mobile homes are dropped from the analyses (N = 2,819).13 The data allow us 
to observe multiple sales per property, not just the most recent. All transactions that had more 
than seven bedrooms were dropped out of concern that the properties were apartment buildings 
(N = 16).  
In order to focus on properties without mineral rights, we use the federal mineral 
ownership data from the Bureau of Land Management’s Colorado GIS office.14 We overlay 
 
12 We assume that the properties from these three counties in western Colorado make up a single housing market. 
This is a common assumption in hedonic analyses, especially in studies that rely on regional or multi-county data 
(e.g., Muehlenbachs et al. 2015). 
13  Results from our main models are robust to including mobile homes and are available in the online appendix 
(Table 5A).  
14 “Statewide Federal Mineral Ownership” data product.  
13 
federal oil and gas ownership data layers with parcel boundaries. We include properties in our 
final sample that are completely contained within the federal mineral ownership boundaries (N = 
871).15 Figure 2 illustrates the process of identifying residential properties with federal mineral 
ownership. The points represent the centroids of parcels sold in a sub-region of our study area. 
White points represent sales of properties that are outside of the area of federal mineral 
ownership. Grey points represent sales of properties with boundaries that overlay, but are not 
within, the federal mineral ownership areas. It is possible that some of these properties are split 
from their minerals, especially those with significant coverage within the federal mineral 
ownership areas. However, the mineral estate designation is unclear. Black dots represent sold 
properties with boundaries that are completely within the extent of federal mineral ownership, 
and thus were split from their minerals by the homestead act extensions of the 20th century.   
While this cuts 98% of the transactions in our database, this restriction is necessary to 
identify the subset of properties that do not benefit financially from nearby drilling. It is likely 
that some properties outside of the federal mineral ownership boundary do not own mineral 
rights, but it is unknown on a property-by-property basis. Thus, the federal mineral ownership 
sample provides the best estimate of the external costs of local oil and gas development. Lastly, 
we cut all observations below the 5th and above the 95th percentile of the sale price distribution to 
remove the influence of outliers. Our final sample is 783 transactions.  
We received directional and horizontal well site data from Drillinginfo. In our three 
counties, there were 4,374 horizontal wells drilled from 2000 to 2014. These wells targeted 
various tight sandstone formations in the Piceance Basin, which crosses our study area. Most 
wells were drilled into the Williams Fork tight sandstone formation (Holmes et al. 2015). Other 
tight sandstones with producing horizontal wells include the Corcoran, Cozzette, and Rollins 
formations (Johnson and Roberts 2003). The Mancos Shale play, which was recently classified 
as holding some of the largest unconventional oil and gas reserves in the country (Hawkins et al. 
2016), has also been targeted during our study’s time period.16 
 
15 There were data scale and alignment issues between our parcel data and our mineral ownership data. As a result, 
our restriction is conservative. There are likely other properties that are severed from their oil and gas rights by the 
SRHA but are not fully within the federal mineral ownership extent. We test our results using less restrictive 
definitions of a split estate (i.e., 75 and 90% of property within federal mineral ownership boundary) and find robust 
results (also available in Table 5A). 
16 As a note, the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission has GIS data available on the direction and length 
of horizontal lateral paths. This data could have been used to identify properties that are close, but do not overlie, 
well laterals. These properties would not receive royalty payments but they would be impacted by the costs of 
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In ArcGIS, we calculate the distance to the closest well site at the time of sale. In 
addition, we calculated additional spatial statistics associated with distance to the closest 
municipality (U.S. Census definition) and the percentage of the property in an agricultural use 
from the National Land Cover Dataset 2001 to use as control variables in our regression model.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics for our preferred sample of split estate properties. 12.5% of 
our sample properties are within one mile of a horizontal well. As we’ll show in the next section, 
this classification defines treatment. Thus, our sample relies on only 98 treated observations for 
identification. While this is justified given the natural experiment, care must be used when 
applying our findings to other areas of shale gas development. Further, most of our treated 
properties in our main specification come from one subdivision in the small combined towns of 
Battlement Mesa, CO and Parachute, CO.  This distribution of properties increases the risk that 
our estimates are subject to individual time varying shocks that are correlated with shale gas 
development near this particular subdivision. While the criteria for creating our main sample are 
ideal for identifying negative externalities, the concentration of treated properties in a single 
subdivision creates the possibility that our estimate is biased by place-specific shocks. In order to 
bolster our findings, we supplement our main analysis with a quasi difference-in-difference 
model that restricts analysis to subdivisions in this combined town. In this model, we control for 
federal mineral rights status to establish the effect of treatment while controlling for common 
trends in property prices. The average treated property has 16.8 wells within one mile, 
demonstrating the high degree of activity in this area. The average selling price is $183,300, and 
the average lot size is 6.4 acres.  No properties in our preferred sample have an on-property 
horizontal well. This is important because surface use agreements must be in place at the time of 
operation, so these payments are unlikely to adulterate the effects estimated using this sample.17  
As discussed in the introduction, prior hedonic valuation papers have focused on 
differences in impacts between municipal water and private well water properties 
 
nearby development. However, the quality of this data is uncertain. Pre-2012 well lateral paths were “automatically 
generated” and “do not represent the true wellbore path.” Only wells drilled after 2012 are likely to depict the actual 
path (See http://cogcc.state.co.us/data2.html#/downloads). 
17 None of our treated properties were located within a BLM oil and gas unit. While any surface use payments would 
attenuate our estimates, there is not sufficient data to understand how often split estate owners in our study area 
receive them. One primary vehicle for surface use payments - protection bonds - are proprietary documents. 
However, a land law examiner with the Bureau of Land Management’s Colorado Office said that these are relatively 
rare. To her knowledge, only two have been passed Colorado from 2013 to the present. 
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(Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber 2014, Muehlenbachs et al. 2015, Boslett et al. 2016). In Colorado, 
data do not exist as to which properties have private vs. public water supply. Our split estate 
properties exist outside of municipal boundaries, which is a proxy for public water service. 
However, it is possible that some of our properties have access to public water systems, as they 
seem to be clustered in certain pockets of the counties.18 Therefore, our estimates may not be 
applicable to households that face the risk of groundwater contamination.  
 
5. Methodology 
 
We use the hedonic price method to estimate the effect of drilling proximity on housing 
prices (Rosen 1974). Our basic specification is: 
(4) ln(𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑡) = 𝛽 ∙ 𝐼(𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 > 0) + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡. 
𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the sale price of property i in spatial unit s in year t. Prices are adjusted to 2015 levels 
using the Consumer Price Index. 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the number of unconventional wells within a given 
distance buffer at the time of sale, and 𝐼(𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 > 0) is a binary variable equal to one if the 
number of wells is greater than zero (i.e., drilling is present). 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡
′  is a vector of structural, 
locational, and environmental explanatory variables. 𝛾𝑠 are spatial fixed effects; we present 
specifications using both county and census tract as the spatial unit. 𝜏𝑡 are year fixed effects. 
Collectively, these fixed effects control for unobserved price determinants across space and time. 
𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the error.  
β is our coefficient of interest and is interpreted as the impact of having an 
unconventional well within r miles of the property on residential sale prices. Since we are only 
analyzing properties with federal mineral ownership, it reflects the marginal value of the 
environmental costs of having an unconventional well within the given spatial buffer.  
Our goal is to define the radius r so that it captures the full spatial extent of negative 
externalities, but this is a priori unknown. In the spirit of Davis (2011) and more recently 
Muehlenbachs et al. (2015), we estimate a version of Equation (4) that includes a series of binary 
variables for different distance bands and seek to determine empirically at what distance the 
impact falls to a statistical zero.  
Figure 3 graphically presents results of a model that regresses log sales price on half mile 
 
18 Phone conversation with Scott McGowan, GIS Coordinator with the Colorado Department of Public Health and 
Environment. 
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distance bandwidths out to two miles, as well as property characteristics, year fixed effects, and 
census tract fixed effects. Results suggest that parameter estimates for the 0-0.5 mile bin and 0.5-
1 mile bin are negative and statistically significant. Coefficient estimates are statistically 
insignificant beyond one mile. These attenuated, insignificant effects beyond 1 mile are robust 
across alternative distance bin classifications and are generally similar to those found by 
Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) and Muehlenbachs et al. (2015), who use a one mile and a 
two kilometer buffer, respectively, in their analyses. The similarity in coefficient estimates 
between the 0-0.5 mile and 0.5-1 mile bins is at first surprising because we would expect greater 
externalities closer to the drill sight. However, Figure 3 also displays the frequency of 
observations by distance and we see clustering of observations around 0.5 miles, which is why it 
is difficult to discern differential impacts less than and greater than 0.5 miles. Going forward, we 
define r equal to one, and hence 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a binary variable equal to 1 if there was a well drilled 
within one mile of the property before its sale. 
 
5.1 Assumptions 
 
There are a number of assumptions needed to interpret our estimates as the valuation of 
the environmental costs of unconventional oil and gas development. First, we assume that the 
assignment to treatment – in this case, close proximity to a horizontal well – is exogenous. It is 
unlikely that split estate owners can strongly dictate whether drilling happens, as the surface 
owner cannot prevent the mineral estate owner from accessing subsurface resources. Impacted 
parties can protest the inclusion of a parcel in an oil and gas lease sale (Bureau of Land 
Management Regulation 43 CFR 3120.1-3), but we were unable to find any protests directly 
from homeowners in our three study counties. A potential concern is that early oil and gas 
development could influence the likelihood of severance. In our case, the likelihood of severance 
is not a concern because of our study area’s historical severance of mineral rights.  
Second, we assume that property buyers and sellers have full information about local 
drilling activity and its potential for environmental impact. This is reasonable given the scale of 
planning and land disturbance associated with well permitting and drilling (e.g., Moran et al. 
2015) and significant local discussion regarding the impacts of drilling (e.g., Williams 2008; 
Lustgarten 2009; Harmon 2014).  This region of Colorado has also been the primary site for 
multiple assessments of the health risks associated with unconventional development (e.g., 
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Kassotis et al. 2013). As a result, home buyers are likely conscious of the potential benefits and 
costs of unconventional oil and gas development. 
Third, property buyers and sellers are informed of the property’s mineral right status and 
they understand its ramifications. There has been significant mineral development in western 
Colorado over the last century (Biewick 2008). As a result, citizens are likely familiar with both 
oil and gas development and mineral ownership laws. The state legislature also passed a law in 
2001 that required pre-transaction notification of the potential for a split estate (Garfield County 
Energy Advisory Board 2007). There has been much public discussion since 2000 regarding a 
law that would mandate disclosure of mineral severance prior to all real estate sales. Although 
this legislation has not been passed due to issues secondary to the disclosure requirement 
(Moreno 2011), it has been a major point of policy discussion in the state legislature over the 
study’s time period. Additionally, federally owned minerals were never disbursed with the land, 
so a title search is relatively quick and the information is publically accessible on the Bureau of 
Land Management’s website.19  
Fourth, we assume that our estimates are not impacted by positive spillover effects of 
unconventional oil and gas development, including labor opportunities and improved public 
finances. Although these can be important benefits of local oil and gas development (e.g., Weber 
2012; Newell and Rami 2015), these benefits are likely to be received at the regional level and 
are unlikely to be related to drilling adjacency or to mineral rights ownership.  
Fifth, we assume that the financial benefits that a split estate owner can receive from 
local development are negligible. Landowners who do not own mineral rights are unable to 
receive lease or royalty payments from on-site production. However, landowners can receive 
compensation through a surface use agreement, which formally outlines where drilling and 
surface disturbances can happen on the property.20 Surface disturbances may occur from drilling, 
building access roads, or other infrastructure that occurs on a homeowner’s property. To 
reiterate, no properties in our preferred sample have a horizontal well on their property. Thus, it 
is unlikely that they have surface use agreements in place and are thus effecting our estimated 
 
19 We relax this assumption in Table 6, where we include observations with unknown mineral ownership. 
20 Matthew Sura, an oil and gas lawyer based in Colorado, stated that surface use agreement payments have 
increased over time due to surface owner complaints. Some companies in Colorado pay as high as $10,000 per well. 
It is unclear how common this practice is, but this value is still considerably lower than what can be expected from 
royalty and lease signing bonuses.  
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valuation of the environmental costs of drilling. 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1 Main Results 
 
In Table 3, we present results that estimate the parameters of Equation (4), defining 
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 as the number of unconventional drill sites within one mile of the property at the time of 
sale. We present four model specifications that sequentially add more control variables to the 
model. Column 1 only includes property and location variables (i.e., number of bedrooms, 
distance to closest municipality), Column 2 adds year fixed effects, Column 3 adds county fixed 
effects, and Column 4 replaces county fixed effects with census tract fixed effects. Across 
columns, the coefficient on proximity ranges from -0.211 to -0.362 and is always statistically 
significantly different from zero. The coefficient increases in magnitude substantially when year 
fixed effects are included, which is intuitive given that drilling (and hence treatment) is 
correlated with time. The coefficient is stable across Columns 2-4. Our preferred model is 
Column 4 that includes both year and tract fixed effects. This specification indicates that houses 
within one mile of unconventional drilling sell for 34.8% less than houses further away, all else 
equal. This discount for proximity when multiplied by the average house price of $183,300 
translates to price reduction of $63,788. Converting this into an annual impact using a 30-year 
mortgage and a 5% interest rate yields $3,952, which is our best estimate of the annual external 
impacts of unconventional oil and gas development. 
 
6.2. Robustness checks 
 
In Table 4, we test for the robustness of this general result across alternative 
specifications and subsets of the data. In Column 1, we include an additional control variable, 
which is the number of vertical (conventional) oil and gas wells drilled within a mile of a 
property between 1980 and 1999. One concern with our main results is that past conventional 
drilling is likely correlated with unconventional drilling, and thus if there is a negative impact on 
prices of past drilling, our estimates in Table 3 could be misattributing the variation from past 
drilling to current drilling. Since recent vertical well development may be an exploratory 
precursor to later horizontal well development, we use pre-2000 data to avoid potential 
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endogeneity issues. In Column 2, we restrict our sample to only properties that have less than 1 
acre of land. This test stems from the concern that most of our treated properties are found in a 
single subdivision. If the price determinants for those properties are different than those on larger 
lots, our estimated treatment effect could be biased. Column 3 restricts the sample to be within 
10 miles of an eventual unconventional well site. One concern with our full sample used in Table 
3 is that some observed sales are far from drilling and may be a poor control group. By 
restricting the spatial distance, we hope to mitigate any bias that results from distant control 
observations. In Column 4, we estimate a repeat sales model and replace tract fixed effects with 
property-level fixed effects, which better control for unobservable characteristics that could be 
correlated with proximity to drilling.  
In Column 5 and 6, we develop a model that allows both for an average effect of any 
wells (similar to our main specification) and a marginal effect for each additional well. 
Specifically, we estimate the following model in Equation (5): 
(5)  𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑡) = 𝛽 ∙ 𝐼(𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 > 0) + 𝜎 ∙ 𝐼(𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 > 0) ∙ (𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 − 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅|𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 > 0)
+ Xist
′ 𝛿 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡   
where 𝛽 is the effect of a house being within one mile of one or more wells at the time of sale 
and 𝜎 is the marginal effect of a single well within one mile conditional on there being at least 
one well. We subtract the conditional mean (16.8) from the continuous measure so that 𝛽 reflects 
the average effect of proximity.  
The coefficient estimates of the average effect of any wells in proximity to a property, 
across these six columns, are largely consistent with the main results. Magnitudes range from -
0.316 to -0.437 and all estimates are statistically significant. From Columns 5 and 6, we estimate 
the additional effect of a well to range from -0.018 to -0.017. Extrapolating these results 
indicates that the first well drilled within one mile decreases housing prices by approximately 
10.0% (Column 5) and 16.8% (Column 6), both of which are substantially larger than the per 
well effect indicating strong non-linearities. However, given our small sample size, we are 
uncomfortable putting too much stock into the extrapolation. We hypothesize that there may be 
even more interesting non-linearities at play, but this is not the paper to estimate them. In sum, 
Table 4 indicates that our estimates of the effect of drilling with one mile of a residential 
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property are largely robust to alternative specifications and subsets of the data.21  
 
6.3. Matching analysis 
 
In this section, we shift to a matching approach in order to better control for observable 
differences between our control and treatment groups (e.g., Abbott and Klaiber 2013; Ghanem 
and Zhang 2014; Ferraro et al. 2015). The main goal of matching is to avoid the issue of 
selection bias and to create valid treatment-control comparisons through pairing on observable 
covariates (e.g., Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008; Angrist and Pischke 2009). This occurs when the 
estimated relationship between treatment status and outcome is driven by inherent differences in 
covariate distributions between treatment and control groups.  
We use matching to further test the robustness of our regression model results. We first 
estimate a propensity score model of the probability of treatment as a function of property-
specific variables:  
(6)          𝐼(𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 > 0) = 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡
′ 𝛼 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡 
Where 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 is defined as above and 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡
′ is a vector of structural and locational explanatory 
variables used in our regression models, along with the number of vertical oil and gas wells 
drilled within a mile of the property from 1980 to 1999, as in Column 1 of Table 5. Including 
year and tract fixed effects would be ideal to control for temporal price trends and spatial 
unobservables, but given our limited sample size these match criteria are infeasible.  
The propensity score is calculated using estimated coefficients from Equation (6). We 
then match treated observation to control observations using nearest neighbor matching with 
replacement. We match each treatment observation to its closest three control observations (3-1 
nearest neighbor matching). We apply a 0.05 caliper on the propensity score. Figure 4 provides 
the propensity score distributions for our control and treatment groups, pre- versus post-
matching, and shows that matching significantly reduces the difference between the 
distributions.22  
 
21 In the online appendix, we provide additional robustness checks. In Table 3A, we find qualitatively similar results 
when we define our treatment variable as the number of wells drilled within one mile of the property’s extent, or 
when we use a distance bin approach. We also estimate our models in levels, as opposed to logs, and find similar 
results (Table 4A). In line with the structure of Table 4, we provide additional robustness check in Table 5A. All 
results from the appendix support our main findings. 
22 Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), Sianesi (2004), and Kassie, Shiferaw, and Muricho (2011), we test the 
balancing between our matched treatment and control groups through mean standardized differences and the pseudo 
R² and likelihood ratio test of joint significance. We find that the mean standardized differences in our variables are 
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Table 5 presents estimates of the treatment effect for our matching models. In Column 1, 
we estimate the difference in means between our treated observations and our matched control 
observations. The estimated difference in log prices is -0.263 and is statistically significant. In 
Columns 2-4, we use the matched sample to ensure covariate balance, but we return to a 
regression framework to account for price dynamics and spatial unobservable variables. Control 
observations can be used more than once, so we weight each transaction proportional to the 
number of times it is used in the matching process using weighted least squares.23  
In Column 2, we control for the estimated propensity score in our regression. The 
coefficient on proximity is -0.239, quite similar to the matching estimate. In Column 3, we add 
year fixed effects. The coefficient here is -0.437, which is a substantial increase in magnitude 
over Columns 1-2. Adding year fixed effects had a similar impact on coefficient magnitude in 
Table 3. In Column 4, we lastly property characteristics and the resulting coefficient is -0.339, 
nearly identical to the main results in Table 3. In conclusion, our matching model improves the 
similarity of our treated and control observations, but results are similar to the regression models.  
 
6.4. Quasi Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
 
The criteria for creating our main sample is ideal for identifying the negative externalities 
of shale development. However, our estimated treatment effect relies primarily on properties 
within a single census tract of Garfield County. The property sales in this census tract are 
primarily made up of the combined towns of Battlement Mesa, CO and Parachute, CO, alongside 
other groups of properties both upstream and downstream of the Colorado River. The treated 
federal mineral properties are relatively small in lot size and are located in one subdivision 
within the combined town (Treated/Control: 92/191 observations, respectively). The concern 
with this distribution of treated properties is that if there is something unobservable about this 
town that leads to differential price trends relative to other areas of our sample counties, then our 
cross-sectional analysis will produce biased estimates.  
To address this shortcoming, we estimate a quasi difference-in-differences model using 
only comparable properties in the census tract that includes Battlement Mesa and Parachute. In 
 
reduced, our Pseudo-R² is reduced, and that the joint significance of the matching covariates is rejected, post-
matching. These results are available in Table 6A in the online appendix. 
23 All transactions not matched to another observation are given zero weight. 
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this model, we are comparing price changes of federal mineral properties (treated) to unknown 
mineral rights properties (control) from the time before drilling began to the time after drilling.  
 
(7)      𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑡) = 𝛽1 ∙  𝐼(𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 > 0) + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽3 ∙  𝐼(𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 > 0)
∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡
′ 𝛿 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡 
 
The parameter of interest is on the interaction term (i.e., 𝛽3), which indicates the impact of 
nearby well development for properties with federal mineral ownership, relative to properties 
with unknown mineral ownership. In addition to using only properties in this single census tract 
discussed above, we exclude properties that are more rural or have different on-property 
amenities by only using those properties with parcels that are less than 1 acre in size. This could 
be important for identification, as most of the split estate properties in this area are small acreage 
properties. This approach also restricts our sample to residential areas that are relatively close in 
distance to each other. In Column 2, we use a repeat sales model with the same restrictions on 
acreage. The model also includes the same covariates 𝑋 as in Equation 4 and year fixed effects. 
Our approach in Table 6 relies on similar pre-treatment trends between both treated and 
non-treated areas to make valid inferences. This approach uses control properties that are similar 
in terms of location and structural characteristics to our treated properties. Thus, any time trend 
that influences the properties in this census tract will be captured by the control properties. The 
spatial distribution of our treated properties may increase the risk of idiosyncratic time varying 
shocks related to changes in neighborhoods overtime. However, subdivisions are relatively close 
in distance to each other in this town. Thus, any unrelated shocks to a subdivision correlated to 
shale drilling should attenuate our estimate as we would expect these shocks to affect nearby 
neighborhoods in the same town.   
In Table 6, we generally find similar estimates to those found in Tables 3 through 5, 
though slightly smaller. In Column 1, we estimate the impact of well drilling on split estate 
properties is -0.282. Our repeat sales model, in Column 2, also finds a similar estimate of -
0.281.24 We do not interpret the estimates of treatment for properties with non-federal mineral 
ownership because of the many issues in interpretation of unknown mineral rights discussed in 
 
24 We also estimate a more traditional difference-in-differences model and find similar results. 
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our conceptual framework. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we quantify the negative externalities associated with unconventional 
extraction of oil and gas using hedonic valuation of residential properties. We exploit the early 
20th century homestead act extensions, including the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, to 
identify properties that do not have mineral rights. These properties cannot benefit financially 
from lease payments or royalties, and in our sample likely do not have surface use agreements. 
Thus, our proximity effect estimates isolate the external costs of unconventional oil and gas 
development. This approach resolves a significant issue in the valuation of unconventional oil 
and gas development, which has caused uncertainty in the interpretation of estimates from 
previous studies.  
The results of our hedonic analysis suggest that houses within one mile of an 
unconventional drill site sell for 34.8% less than comparable properties without proximate 
drilling. This discount translates to a price reduction of $63,788, which equals $3,952 when 
annualized by a 30-year mortgage and a 5% interest rate. We interpret this price difference as the 
household valuation of the external environmental and health costs associated with proximity to 
unconventional oil and gas development.  
Our findings are 60% larger in magnitude than the largest existing negative estimate. Our 
study’s ability to identify split estate properties is likely the cause of this disparity. However, it is 
important to understand this effect in the context of some of the gains that can be received by 
homeowners who do own their property’s mineral rights. We used Drillinginfo’s production and 
lease data to obtain a rough estimate for the potential royalties received by those who do own 
minerals. From 2000 to 201225 in our study area, the average royalty rates were 14.7%. In the 
first five years of a well’s lifetime in our study area, average production is 476 million cubic feet 
of natural gas and 1,980 barrels of oil.26 Given wellhead prices at $4,718/mmcf of natural gas27 
 
25 Timeline based on the availability of lease data from Drillinginfo. 
26 These estimates are based on only those wells producing from 2000 to 2015 for at least five years. Wells that only 
produced in 2011 or beyond are not included in this estimate. We focus our analysis on only the first five years 
given the steep decline curves associated with unconventional oil and gas development. 
27 Natural gas wellhead price for Colorado (dollars per thousand cubic feet). Average annual value from 2000 to 
2010.  
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and $58.70/barrel of oil 28, the undiscounted level of royalty payments within the first five years 
of well production is $347,213. At the median royalty rate of 12.5% (the recommended rate by 
the Colorado Land Board at the time of our study), the value of the payment stream is $295,249. 
These estimates should be considered alongside broader work by Brown, Fitzgerald, and Weber 
(2016), which estimate that over $39 billion dollars in royalties were generated from oil and gas 
production from the United States’ six largest shale plays in 2014. What each property owner 
would receive from this estimate would be a function of the owner’s proportional acreage within 
the area of the drilling unit and their ability to negotiate the royalty rate. Given this general 
projection, we believe that royalty payments may be very significant for those property owners 
that retain mineral ownership. The lease payments and future royalty streams may be large 
enough to compensate for environmental and health risks.  
Our findings can inform the United States and other countries in how to proceed with 
energy development. The suite of energy options available to consumers have benefits and costs 
that are received at global, regional, and local levels, in all stages of development from extraction 
to ultimate consumption. Our estimates of the local external costs of unconventional oil and gas 
development should be considered with those incurred from other forms of energy production, 
including coal-fired power plants (Davis 2011), wind turbines (Lang, Opaluch, and Sfinarolakis 
2014; Gibbons 2015), and nuclear power facilities (Gawande, Jenkins-Smith, and Yuan 2013). 
For areas that allow local regulation of oil and gas development, optimal local policy responses 
to unconventional oil and gas development should consider these results alongside others which 
find positive valuations of development (Boslett et al. 2016), employment effects (Weber 2011), 
and income effects (e.g., Feyrer, Mansur, and Sacerdote 2015).  
Understanding mineral rights ownership and its impacts is important beyond the housing 
market. The level of local mineral ownership may have long-term impacts on how drilling 
influences long-term economic development in local communities. Research has found that oil 
and gas development can have positive (Michaels 2011) and negative (Jacobsen and Parker 
2016) long-term economic effects on local communities. High levels of local mineral rights 
severance may dampen the potential for local investment in infrastructure and capital since 
royalty and lease bonus payments are directed outside of drilling areas. Local policy-makers may 
 
28 Domestic Crude Oil First Purchase Prices by Area for Colorado (dollars per barrel). Average annual value from 
2000 to 2015.  
25 
be further incentivized to regulate development in such a way as to reduce both the external costs 
of development and encourage investment in the local community. Future research should 
explore how levels of local mineral ownership relate to the long-term economic impacts of oil 
and gas development. 
Lastly, prior hedonic valuation research provides great insight on local valuation of 
unconventional oil and gas development, especially on its perceived water quality risks. While 
we caution extrapolation of our result based on the small sample size, external validity outside of 
the United States is limited in previous studies because private citizens in European and many 
other countries do not own subsurface minerals which makes this natural experiment applicable 
to other countries. Our study may be relevant and applicable to a broader geographic area than 
Colorado and may provide a better metric for external costs of unconventional oil and gas 
exploration in other countries because it explicitly accounts for the critical issue of mineral rights 
ownership.  
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Tables & Figures 
 
 
Table 1: Financial benefits and environmental costs of oil and gas development, differentiated 
by mineral estate ownership classification 
 
Local Environmental 
Costs 
Local Financial 
Benefits 
Valuation of 
Proximity 
Unified )1( =iM  C  B  BC +  
Split )0( =iM  C  0 C  
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
   
Percent of properties with horizontal wells: 
   within 1 mile 12.5  
   within 2 miles 34.6  
   within 3 miles 38.2  
   
Number of horizontal wells within 1 
   mile, conditional on existence 
16.8 15.8 
  
   
Sale price ($000s) 183.3 81.4 
Lot size (acres) 6.4 26.7 
Property age (years) 17.8 16.4 
Bedrooms 3.0 0.7 
Bathrooms 2.0 0.6 
Living area (000s of sq. feet) 1.6 0.7 
Distance to municipality (in miles) 1.8 3.4 
Percent of parcel in agricultural use 3.0 14.4 
Number of vertical wells < 1 mile 0.9 1.1 
   
Observations 783   
Notes: Sample is comprised of only properties with federal mineral rights. We 
received residential property transaction, structural, and parcel data from Garfield, 
Mesa, and Rio Blanco county assessment and geographic information systems 
(GIS) offices. We also received location data for all horizontal wells drilled from 
2000 to 2015 and all vertical wells drilled from 1980 to 1999 in Colorado from 
Drillinginfo. We calculated the percentage of each property in an agricultural use 
using National Land Cover Dataset 2001 data. We calculated the distance to the 
closest municipality using U.S. Census Bureau TIGER data from 2010.  
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Table 3: The effect of unconventional development on the residential properties with federal 
mineral ownership 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
I(wells > 0) 
-0.211*** -0.343*** -0.362*** -0.348*** 
(0.033) (0.025) (0.064) (0.059)      
 
R-Squared 0.397 0.499 0.513 0.547 
Property & Location Vars. Y Y Y Y 
Year FE N Y Y Y 
County FE N N Y N 
Tract FE N N N Y 
Notes: Observations represent single family residential properties sold from 2000 to early 2015 in Garfield, Mesa, and 
Rio Blanco counties (N = 783). We truncate the data set to exclude the 5 and 95 percentiles of sale price. The 
dependent variable is the natural log of sale price (CPI-adjusted to 2014 values). Property variables include quadratics 
of # of bedrooms and bathrooms, parcel acreage, property finished living area, and property age. Location variables 
include quadratics of distance to the closest municipality and the percentage of the property in an agricultural use. 
Census tracts are based on U.S. Census 2010 boundaries. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated 
using tract-level cluster-robust inference: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: Robustness checks and extensions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Vertical 
well 
control 
Acreage 
Restriction 
Well 
Distance 
Restriction 
Repeat 
Sales 
Add 
Intensity 
Repeat 
Sales 
+ 
Intensity   <1 acres <10 miles 
       
I(wells > 0) 
-0.348*** -0.324*** -0.316*** -0.381*** -0.384*** -0.437*** 
(0.0596) (0.069) (0.065) (0.076) (0.039) (0.086) 
       
I(wells > 0) * wells 
    -0.018*** -0.017*** 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Observations 783 574 638 522 783 522 
R-Squared 0.560 0.596 0.579 0.798 0.584 0.816 
Property & Location Vars. Y Y Y N Y N 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Tract FE Y Y Y N Y N 
Property FE N N N Y N Y 
Notes: In Column 1, we include a control for the number of vertical (conventional) oil and gas wells drilled from 1980 to 1999 
within one mile of the property. In Columns 2 and 3, we restrict our sample to only those observations that are less than 1 acre 
and 10 miles of a well drilled pre or post-sale, respectively. In Column 4, we estimate a repeat sales model using only properties 
that transacted more than once from 2000 to 2015. In Column 5, we include a continuous measure of the number of wells within 
one mile of a property. We transform this variable by subtracting the mean number of wells conditional on the number of wells 
being greater than zero (16.8). This specification identifies both an average effect of proximity and a marginal effect of an 
additional well. Column 6 estimates the Column 5 specification using a repeat sales model. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses and are estimated using tract-level cluster-robust inference: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: The effect of unconventional development on split estate properties using matching techniques 
 Nearest Neighbor 
Matching 
 
Weighted Regression 
 
 
 
(3 - 1) 
 
Only P.S. + Year FE 
+ Property 
Variables  
 
  (1)   (2) (3) (4)       
I(wells > 0) 
-0.263***  -0.239*** -0.437*** -0.333** 
(0.053)  (0.050) (0.057) (0.129)       
R-Squared     0.073 0.425 0.617 
Notes: In Columns 1, we use nearest neighbor matching (3 - 1) and match on the # of bedrooms and bathrooms, living area, 
property age, and acreage, as well as the distance to the closest municipality, the percentage of the property in an agricultural 
use, and the number of vertical wells drilled within a mile from 1980 to 1999. We match with replacement and with a caliper 
of 0.05. In Column 2 through 4, we use our treatment observations and matched control observations from our Nearest 
Neighbor matching in Column 1 and estimate weighted regression models (in line with Equation 1 and Table 3). We weight 
based on the number of times each control observation was matched to a treatment observation. In Column 2, we only 
control for the estimated propensity score. In Column 3, we add year fixed effects. In Column 4, we add the structural and 
locational variables defined above. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using tract-level cluster-
robust inference: ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: The effect of unconventional development on the residential properties 
with federal and unknown mineral ownership 
  (1) (2) 
   
I(wells > 0) 
-0.091** -0.185*** 
(0.046) (0.069)    
Federal Mineral Ownership 
-0.097** - 
(0.046) -    
I(wells > 0) * Federal Mineral Ownership 
-0.282*** -0.281*** 
(0.066) (0.086) 
   
Observations 1,683 1,464 
R-Squared 0.232 0.567 
Property & Location Vars. Y N 
Year FE Y Y 
Property FE N Y 
Notes: We truncate the data set to exclude the 5 and 95 percentiles of sale price. The dependent 
variable is the natural log of sale price (CPI-adjusted to 2014 values). In both columns we restrict 
our sample to include only those properties in the census tract with the bulk of our treated split 
estate properties. In Column 1 we restrict properties to have less than 1 acre of land while in 
Column 2 we restrict to only properties with multiple sales. Property variables include quadratics 
of # of bedrooms and bathrooms, parcel acreage, property finished living area, and property age. 
Location variables include quadratics of distance to the closest municipality and the percentage of 
the property in an agricultural use. Census tracts are based on U.S. Census 2010 boundaries. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using tract-level cluster-robust 
inference: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1: Map of unconventional oil and gas development in Colorado 
 
Notes: Unconventional well location data was provided by Drillinginfo. Data on federal mineral ownership is from 
the Bureau of Land Management Colorado Office’s GIS department.  
 
  
40 
Figure 2: Large scale map of a subset of horizontal wells and property transactions with different 
mineral estate classifications 
 
Notes: Horizontal oil and gas well data is from Drillinginfo. Split estate sales represent transactions of properties 
with boundaries that are completely within the federal mineral ownership boundaries from the Bureau of Land 
Management. Potential split estate sales are those transactions of properties that overlay, but are not within, the 
federal mineral ownership boundaries. Unknown estate sales are transactions of properties that do not overlay, even 
minimally, areas with federal mineral ownership. Private/Private and Private/Federal indicates the intersections 
between privately-owned land with privately-owned minerals and federally-owned minerals, respectively. 
Federal/Federal are government lands in which both mineral and surface rights are owned federally. 
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Figure 3: Distance bin parameter estimates and histogram of well distance 
 
  
 
Notes: In the left graph, we highlight parameter estimates for distance bins in line with Equation 4. We define our 
treatment variable as a bin variable (see Equation 5). Each estimate reflects the impact of the closest well from the 
property drilled within the distance bin range, relative to the omitted category of having the closest well drilled 
beyond two miles. In the right graph, we highlight the distribution of distance to closest unconventional well. We 
only include those wells that were drilled before the sale of the home.  
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Figure 4: Propensity score distributions for one mile treatment, pre versus post matching 
(Nearest Neighbor 3 – 1) 
 
Notes: These graphs highlight the difference in propensity score distribution, pre versus post-matching. Variables 
included in the propensity score estimation include the # of bedrooms and bathrooms, parcel acreage, property 
finished living area, property age, distance to the closest municipality, the percentage of the property in an 
agricultural use, and the number of vertical oil and gas wells drilled within a mile from 1980 to 1999. 
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